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Mr Singh did not accept this fatalism.
辛格先生并不接受这种宿命论。
Blame for India’s stagnant exports lay not just with global forces outside India’s control, but with “stumbling blocks” that Indian officials had left in exporters’ way.
印度出口的停滞不仅是因为印度无法控制的全球力量，还因为印度官员给出口商设置了“绊脚石”。
“Official policy has been far too slow in recognising the necessity of a sustained export drive,” he wrote in 1963.
“官方政策迟迟未能认识到持续出口驱动的必要性。”辛格在1963年写道。
As finance minister almost 30 years later, he had a chance to put his ideas into action.
近30年后他成为财政部长，有机会将自己的想法付诸行动。
In 1991 the country was on the brink of a financial crisis.
1991年，印度处于金融危机的边缘。
To secure an international loan, the central bank had to air-lift gold to London.
为了获得国际贷款，印度中央银行不得不空运黄金到伦敦。
It was clear that India needed to cut spending by reducing the budget deficit.
很明显，印度需要通过减少预算赤字来削减开支。
Mr Singh also believed it could “switch” spending by devaluing the rupee.
辛格先生还认为，印度可以通过使卢比贬值来“转换”支出。
The cheaper currency attracted foreign demand for India’s exports and discouraged spending on imports.
卢比贬值吸引了外国对印度出口的需求，并抑制了在进口方面的支出。
These two measures might have been enough to solve the immediate crisis.
这两项措施或许足以解决眼前的危机。
But Mr Singh seized his chance to do more.
但是辛格先生抓住机会做了更多事情。
The rupee devaluation gave him cover to cut import tariffs and remove export subsidies.
趁卢比贬值，他削减了进口关税并取消了出口补贴。
He also gave firms freedom to grow without a licence.
他还让企业无需许可证即可自由经营。
The reforms reinforced each other, as Montek Singh Ahluwalia, his ally, has pointed out.
正如他的盟友蒙特克·辛格·阿卢瓦利亚所指出的，这些改革相得益彰。
India, for example, found it easier to attract investment from Japan when it became possible for Japanese expats to import food items from their home country.
例如，印度发现，当日本侨民可以从日本进口食品时，吸引日本的投资就变得更容易。
Mr Singh’s legacy is vast.
辛格先生留下了巨大的遗产。
Lant Pritchett of the London School of Economics and co-authors have tried to add up all of the additional goods and services India produced from 1993 to 2002 that an unreformed economy would not have.
伦敦经济学院的兰特·普里切特及其合著者尝试把印度在1993年至2002年间产生的所有额外商品和服务加起来，如果没有贸易改革，这些商品和服务是不会产生的。
Converted into today’s dollars and appropriately discounted (as benefits were spread over years) the total could exceed $1.5trn.
换算成现在的美元，并进行适当的折算后（因为收益分摊在很多年），这些商品和服务的总额可能超过1.5万亿美元。
As prime minister from 2004 to 2014, Mr Singh reaped some of what he had sowed.
在2004年至2014年担任总理期间，之前播下的一些种子给辛格先生带来了收获。
The economy grew briskly until a spate of corruption scandals paralysed government decision-making.
经济增长一直很活跃，直到一连串的腐败丑闻使政府决策陷入瘫痪。
Foreign capital was often plentiful.
外国资本一直很充足。
Dollars poured in from exports of IT services, an industry the fatalists did not foresee.
IT服务出口带来了源源不断的美元，IT是宿命论者没有预见到的行业。
India’s foreign-currency reserves, $1bn in 1991, exceeded $280bn by the end of his tenure.
印度的外汇储备在1991年为10亿美元，到辛格总理任期结束时超过了2800亿美元。
Despite this change, India is still insecure about its position in the global division of labour.
尽管发生了这种变化，印度仍然对其在全球劳动分工中的地位感到不安全。
Its tariffs are higher than most of its Asian peers.
印度的关税比大多数亚洲国家都要高。
It refused to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, an Asian trade deal, because it feared Chinese competition.
它拒绝加入亚洲贸易协定《区域全面经济伙伴关系协定》，因为担心来自中国的竞争。
Some economists doubt India can ever emulate East Asia’s industrial success, given its restrictive land and labour laws.
一些经济学家怀疑，由于印度的土地和劳动法具有限制性，印度是否能够效仿东亚的工业成功。
Mr Singh has passed away. Export fatalism lives on.
辛格先生已经去世，但出口宿命论存而不亡。
